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Phasing out the U.S. Federal Helium Reserve:  
Policy insights from a world helium model ☆  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops a detailed partial equilibrium model of the global helium market to 
study the effects of the recently decided rapid phase out of the U.S. Federal Helium 
Reserve (FHR), a vast strategic stockpile accumulated during the 1960s. The model 
incorporates a detailed representation of that industry and treats both helium producers 
and the FHR as players in a dynamic non-cooperative game. The goal of each player is 
assumed to be the maximization of discounted profit, subject to technical and resource 
constraints. We consider two alternative policies aimed at organizing the phase out of the 
FHR: the currently implemented one and a less stringent one whereby the FHR would be 
allowed to operate as a profit-maximizing agent during an extended period of time. 
Evidences gained from a series of market simulations indicate that, compared to the 
current policy, a less stringent policy mandate systematically increases the financial 
return to the U.S. federal budget, always enhances environmental outcomes as it lowers 
helium venting into the atmosphere, and also augments global welfare in three out of the 
four scenarios considered in the paper.  
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1. Introduction 
The worldwide consumption of helium, a noble gas that combines a number of remarkable 
properties,1 is growing rapidly. This natural element is used in a number of advanced technologies (e.g., 
leak detection, chromatography, welding under inert conditions) and is a nearly non-substitutable input 
in a disparate set of activities including fiber-optic technology, electronic manufacturing (e.g., 
semiconductors, flat panels), rocket launching (to purge the fuel tanks), and cryogenics. Helium is also 
critically needed to cool magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanners, a now essential diagnostic tool 
for the medical community. During the years 2007–2013, that historically stable market experienced a 
series of noticeable supply shortages and unusually high prices.2 Given the critical importance of that 
commodity for our modern societies, helium suddenly emerged as a source of political concern (NRC, 
2010; Nuttall et al., 2012a; Glowacki et al., 2013) and the future availability of helium resources 
subsequently became the topic of a burgeoning literature authored by science and technology experts.3 
The present paper provides a complementary perspective as it details an economic analysis of the world 
helium market and examines the rationale of a U.S. government policy: the 2013 Helium Stewardship 
Act (HSA).  
Helium is an exhaustible finite resource. Though helium is naturally present in the atmosphere, its 
concentration is so low that the cost of separating it from the air is prohibitive. Commercial helium is 
thus obtained as an optional by-product of a second exhaustible resource: natural gas. Helium can be 
separated from the gas streams extracted from a limited number of helium-rich natural gas deposits. If 
not separated, the helium in fuel gas is typically wasted as it dissipates in the atmosphere when the gas 
is burned without significantly increasing the atmospheric concentration of helium.  
                                                 
1 Helium has the lowest boiling point of any substance, is the second-best gaseous conductor of heat and electricity, and is the 
second lightest element. 
2 “The price of helium, Inflated,” The Economist, May 3, 2007. 
3 For example, Cai et al. (2010) report a joint research effort by scientists and industrial experts at Cambridge (UK) that 
culminated in the development of a detailed system dynamics model of the world helium industry. Another example is the 
analysis in Mohr and Ward (2014) which has its methodological roots in the geoscience literature. 
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To conserve helium resources, a vast strategic stockpile – the Federal Helium Reserve (FHR) – 
was accumulated by the U.S. government as part of the country’s cold war efforts during the 1960s. It 
was then expected that the revenues obtained from the sales of the stored helium during the 1970s 
would permit a recovery of the cost of the FHR by 1980 (Epple and Lave, 1982). However, that plan 
failed and the U.S. government had to wait until 1996 before being able to start reselling its reserve 
(NRC, 2000). In 2013, the U.S. Treasury debt accumulated through the helium program was finally 
paid back, yet nearly a third of the original stockpile still remained. As a result, that long-awaited debt 
repayment convinced the U.S. Congress to pass the 2013 HSA instructing the federal government to: (i) 
rapidly deplete the remaining inventory – the Act imposes the sale of a flow of helium, equal to the 
amount the FHR can produce, each year – and (ii) subsequently cease its commercial operations. 
Accordingly, the federal government’s commercial operations are expected to cease in 2022. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economics of this rapid phase out of the FHR. 
Deciding how much helium to extract from the remainder of the Federal Reserve requires answering 
more general questions about the allocation of helium resources over time, the potential future demand 
by helium-dependent technologies, the potential new sources that may become available in the future, 
and the nature of the strategic interactions among helium producers. To the best of our knowledge, such 
a methodologically sound analysis was not conducted to guide the provisions in the 2013 Act. The two 
main informal arguments that motivated the 2013 Act can be summarized as follows. First, because of 
the progressive depletion of the underground reservoir, the annual production capacity of the FHR is 
expected to gradually fall in the coming years, thereby providing an opportunity for a smooth phase out 
of the FHR. Second, new sources of helium, both foreign and domestic, will shortly become available, 
thereby limiting the need for FHR supplies in the near future. Nevertheless, it is not certain that the 
proposed extraction trajectory maximizes the present discounted value of the profits from federal sales 
nor that this is a socially desirable policy. As the federal sales represented approximately 30 percent of 
the global helium supplies in 2013 (USGS, 2015), one may wonder whether the rapid resource 
extraction pattern stipulated in the 2013 Act could artificially generate low prices, thereby blurring the 
functioning of the helium market and distorting the firms’ decisions. 
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To investigate the extraction trajectory that should be considered by the U.S. federal government, 
we propose a computerized dynamic model of the international wholesale helium market aimed at 
evaluating helium production and investment strategies. This deterministic, discrete-time, finite-horizon 
oligopoly model is formulated as an open-loop, Nash non-cooperative dynamic game that is solved 
numerically. Using this model, a series of simulations under markedly different scenarios are conducted 
to determine the optimal resource extraction patterns for the FHR and quantify their economic impact 
on both the world helium market and the U.S. federal treasury. Overall, we believe that this multi-
period model is a valuable tool for public decision makers, professionals, and scholars interested in the 
politically sensitive issues observed in the helium sector.  
Our analysis highlights that the rapid resource extraction path falls short of the policy objective to 
maximize the “returns to the American taxpayers”. Implementing a slower extraction pattern has the 
potential to bring about sizeable gains to the U.S. Treasury. Depending on the scenario, we found that 
the present discounted value of its future stream of net revenues would rise by between +25.5 percent 
and +61.0 percent. Another important finding is that such an augmentation is not necessarily obtained at 
the expense of the consumer surplus and is welfare-enhancing in three out of the four scenarios 
examined in this paper. Lastly, we observe that the rapid phase out of the FHR occasions a net waste of 
helium which is estimated to be on the order of 122.8–533.2 MMcf. 
From a methodological perspective, the rich literature on dynamic-games (e.g., Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1979; Dockner et al., 2000; Long, 2011) typically focuses on parsimonious continuous-time 
models that are analytically tractable. In the present paper, we examine the market equilibrium of a 
detailed model for which an analytical solution is virtually out of reach but, following Mathiesen (1985) 
and Rutherford (1995), a numerical one can be obtained by reformulating the market equilibrium 
problem as an instance of a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).4 In recent years, a growing 
literature has applied that methodology to investigate a variety of issues including: the impact of a CO2 
regulation on power investment and electricity prices (Fan et al., 2010; Lise et al., 2010); the effects of 
                                                 
4 An MCP is a square system of nonlinear inequalities that represent the economic equilibrium through zero marginal profit 
and market balance conditions determining equilibrium quantities and prices (Cottle et al., 1992; Gabriel et al., 2012a; 
Murphy et al., 2016). 
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renewable energy penetration in Europe for gains from trade and carbon dioxide emissions in the power 
sector (Abrell and Rausch, 2016) or the strategic behavior of producers in either power (Bushnell, 2003; 
Pineau et al., 2011), natural gas (Gabriel et al., 2005; Egging et al., 2008; Holz et al., 2008; Gabriel et 
al., 2012b; Abada et al., 2013), oil (Huppmann and Holz, 2012) or coal industries (Haftendorn and 
Holz, 2010; Trüby and Paulus, 2012; Trüby, 2013). This paper represents the very first application of 
that method to model the helium industry. 
At an empirical level, this paper contributes to the small, and very much needed, literature 
attempting to shed a light on helium economics. It should be noted that there is a dearth of recent 
economic analyses of the world helium market. The existing economics literature on that inert gas is 
limited to the U.S. market and predominantly dates back to the 1980s when the U.S. dominated the 
world helium market . At that time, the discussion chiefly revolved around the issue of the rationale for 
U.S. governmental stockpiles. In one of the very first articles analyzing the economics of helium, Epple 
and Lave (1980) present an early numerical model of the U.S. helium industry. Drawing upon the 
operations research literature, they formulate a mathematical programming problem aimed at 
determining the optimal rate of helium production and storage (private and public) over time that would 
maximize the discounted social welfare. In this model, the rate of natural gas production is assumed to 
be exogenous. The model is solved numerically under a series of alternative scenarios, combining two 
possible demand projections and three possible values for the discount rate. The results do not provide 
any justification for government intervention in the helium industry.  
Other related works, though more loosely connected to ours from a methodological perspective, 
are the empirical studies in Liu (1983) and Uri (1986, 1987). In these articles, a structural econometric 
model of the helium market is specified and estimated to either build supply and demand projections 
(Liu, 1983; Uri, 1987) or empirically confirm that demand and industry supply respond to normal 
market forces (Uri, 1986). The case of helium extraction has also motivated a handful of contributions 
in the theoretical literature on natural resources economics. For example, the analytical model in 
Pindyck (1982) considers the joint extraction of two finite exhaustible resources forming a composite 
ore and examines how the price trajectory of each resource depends on its demand, and the demands 
and storage costs of the other resource. The article uses a continuous time formulation and shows that 
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the competitive market will extract, produce, and store at socially optimal rates if firms are risk-neutral 
and the average cost of storage is constant. The results provide little economic justification for 
government programs aimed at stockpiling helium. Further extensions of that analytical framework are 
given in Hughey (1989) where the role of helium demand in the market equilibria for both natural gas 
and helium is investigated, and in Hughey (1991) which assesses the economics of three subsidy 
policies that could be implemented in the helium sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we clarify the background. The third section 
presents the framework of our analysis and details the conceptual structure of a computerized model of 
the global helium market. Section 4 contains our simulation results and the last section offers a 
summary and some concluding remarks. For the sake of clarity, Appendix A summarizes the 
nomenclature and Appendix B presents the calibration of the demand function. The cost and geological 
parameters used in our market simulations are detailed in Appendix C. 
2. Background and motivation 
This section briefly reviews the history of the U.S. strategic helium reserve and the recent trends 
observed in the global helium market with the aim to clarify both the background and the motivation of 
our analysis. 
2.1 The build-up of the Federal Helium Reserve 
From 1917 to 1961, the U.S. government had a monopolistic position in the global production of 
helium, and government agencies and their contractors were its primary consumers. In the early 1960s, 
a conjunction of factors—including the depletion of the government’s helium-rich deposits and the 
perceived strategic importance of helium for both defense and space exploration—convinced Congress 
to authorize an ambitious conservation policy: the creation of a strategic stockpile of helium at an 
underground reservoir at the Cliffside gas field near Amarillo, Texas. Under this Helium Program, the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines was instructed to: (i) invest in a helium pipeline infrastructure connecting the 
helium-rich gas deposits in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas to that storage site; and (ii) buy almost all the 
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helium that these natural gas producers could produce under negotiated long-term contracts, thereby 
encouraging them to invest in helium separation capabilities.  
On the premise that helium demand would rise exponentially, the aim of the program was to store 
volumes in the 1960s that would be needed in the 1970s. Sales of the stored helium in the 1970s were to 
take place at a price calculated to recover the costs incurred by the federal government by 1980. 
However, in the early 1970s, it became evident that lower-than-expected demand levels would 
materialize during this decade. In 1973, the U.S. government ceased accumulating helium and canceled 
the purchase agreements. The sudden suspension of these purchases caused a considerable resource 
waste as private helium separation plants were mothballed and an annual volume of 2.2 billion cubic 
feet (Bcf) of unsold helium resources were again vented into the atmosphere (Sears, 2012). To conserve 
helium, in 1975 the U.S. Bureau of Mines decided to allow those private companies with separation 
plants connected to the federal gathering system to store privately-owned helium in the Cliffside 
reservoir. Since then, this storage service has been offered at cost and has enabled diminished helium 
venting in the U.S. One should note that even today this is still the unique facility in the world, allowing 
private storage of helium.  
2.2 The long-awaited repayment of the helium-related federal debt  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the helium market experienced an enduring oversupply situation and 
private firms were selling helium at a lower price than the posted price for governmental helium. This 
posted price was administratively determined on the basis of the historical cost of the helium program. 
As there was no demand for federal helium at that price, the federal inventory remained unchanged 
(Epple and Lave, 1982). Over the years, the growing cost of the helium-related federal debt recurrently 
questioned the economic rationale of government intervention in that industry. In his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association, T.C. Koopmans deplored that economic reasoning 
played no role in the decision to build the strategic helium reserve: it was motivated solely by 
arguments over future demand projections anticipating the effective deployment of radically new 
technologies without assessing the costs and benefits of that policy (Koopmans, 1979).  
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During the late 1980s, a growing global consumption of helium was observed and helium prices 
gradually increased to approach parity with the posted price of the U.S. Bureau of Mines (Sears, 2012). 
This situation opened a policy debate on how to optimally clear the federal helium inventory. In 1995, 
the responsibility for operating the helium program was transferred to the U.S. Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM). 
In 1996, the Congress passed the Helium Privatization Act that instructed the BLM to privatize its 
helium-purifying facilities, sell the helium reserve in the Cliffside reservoir by 2015 and organize the 
cessation of the FHR operations by no later than 2015. The main policy objective pursued in the 1996 
Act was to organize the repayment of the $1.4 billion debt accumulated by the helium program. The 
provisions in the 1996 Act were thus aimed at ensuring that the revenues derived from these sales 
would be sufficient to repay the federal government for its helium-related spending, including the 
historical purchasing cost, the investment cost in the supporting infrastructure, and the interest. This 
was done using a minimum price formula based on historical cost figures that stipulated, for each year, 
the minimum price above which federally-owned helium could be sold.  
2.3 An optimal phase out of the Federal Helium Reserve? 
By October 2013, the debt had surprisingly been paid off ahead of schedule and yet a third of the 
original federal stockpile (i.e., approximately 10.8 Bcf) still remained. As the provisions in the 1996 
Act did not envisage the continued operation of the helium program after the repayment of the federal 
debt (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), this sooner-than-expected reimbursement 
generated anxiety among market participants as some feared it could end with a brutal shutdown of the 
FHR, causing an immediate shortage of helium.5 The Congress thus enacted the ‘Helium Stewardship 
Act’ of 2013 that allocates a volume of 3 Bcf to future noncommercial uses (e.g., national security uses, 
federally-funded scientific research) and secures the continued commercial operation of the reserve 
until the remaining volume of federally-owned helium in the reserve attains that 3 Bcf threshold. The 
BLM’s commercial operations (i.e., the federal helium sales and the provision of private storage service 
                                                 
5 “Helium, inflation warning,” The Economist, September 28, 2013. 
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to helium producers connected to the BLM’s helium pipeline infrastructure) are compelled to cease 
afterwards.  
From a practical perspective, the 2013 legislation introduces a radical change in the pricing 
mechanism used for disposing of the federal helium sales as it instructs the BLM to implement an 
auction mechanism. The move toward a market-oriented pricing mechanism for the federal sales of 
helium represents a policy response to the preceding BLM’s pricing policy that was judged inadequate 
and may have delayed the industry’s efforts to develop alternative helium sources (NRC, 2010).6 In the 
present paper, we do not explicitly model the BLM auction but rather consider that the federal helium is 
sold at the market clearing price in the world helium market.  
The 2013 Act also instructs the BLM to offer for sale in each year a quantity of helium set at the 
maximum total production capacity of the Federal Helium System. The technical staff at the BLM thus 
conducted a series of detailed reservoir engineering studies to identify the maximum production 
capacity that could be attained by the FHR in each year. Figure 1 summarizes the outcome of these 
engineering studies and presents the 2014–2029 time-path that gives the maximum amount of helium 
that can be extracted in each year from the FHR as a function of the remaining reserve that year. If this 
“as-fast-as-technically-possible” extraction trajectory is effectively implemented by the BLM, there will 
be annual sales of diminishing volumes until 2022 (i.e., over nine years), at which point the 3 Bcf 
threshold triggering the cessation of the BLM’s commercial activities will be attained.  
Figure 1. The time-path of the FHR’s planned production trajectory 
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ] 
Given the relative sizes of the FHR and the world helium market, one may wonder whether this 
rapid extraction trajectory could have a negative impact on helium prices. Surprisingly, to the best of 
our knowledge, economic considerations played no role in the determination of that extraction 
                                                 
6 One of the unintended consequences of the 1996 Act was that the BLM's posted price gradually became a market benchmark 
for the global price of helium in the contracts signed by private industrial gas companies. During 2007–2013, there was a 
global shortage of helium but the posted price of federal helium remained close to the minimum price established in the 1996 
Act and was thus predominantly based on historical cost figures with little or no consideration for the actual value of helium.  
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trajectory which was solely derived from technological concerns. The purpose of the present analysis is 
thus to examine the economic rationale for such a rapid depletion strategy for the FHR. In particular, we 
aim at comparing the market outcomes obtained under the 2013 Act with those obtained with a 
hypothetical policy that allows the BLM to conduct commercial operations during an enlarged period of 
either 13, 18 or 23 years. 
2.4 A changing world helium scene 
The global helium market has recently undergone a series of fundamental changes and taking them 
into account is critical when attempting to analyze the impacts of the proposed closure of the FHR.  
First, from a global perspective, helium supply has long been dominated by the U.S. but most new 
sources are developing elsewhere. Between 2008 and 2013, the U.S. share of worldwide helium 
extraction capacity declined from 75.5 percent to 66.1 percent (IHS, 2014). The other helium-producing 
nations are: Poland (1.6% of the 2013 global capacity), Russia (2.6%), Algeria (11.9%), Qatar (15.5%), 
China (0.1%), and Australia (2.2%). Further capacity expansions are scheduled to start up in the coming 
five years in Algeria and Qatar. In addition, Russia is endowed with substantial helium reserves in the 
remote, undeveloped gas fields in East Siberia and could also soon emerge as a major producer in the 
world helium market. The state company Gazprom is currently developing these fields to export natural 
gas to China and has also unveiled ambitious plans to install large-scale helium separation facilities 
there. Helium production could commence after 2020 and, if fully developed, that project could make 
Russia the world’s largest helium producer. Nevertheless, it is believed that this project will have to be 
phased because of both the size of the project and the lack of infrastructure in this remote area 
(Gasworld, 2016). The exact timing and magnitude of this phased development are still unknown but, 
given its size, this Russian project is likely to have an important impact on future helium prices. 
Second, within the U.S., the industry structure is also expected to radically change as helium 
production will severely decline owing to the accelerating net depletion of the natural gas fields in 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas, and the associated decline in extraction capacity. New projects are 
currently being developed in other areas not connected to the BLM pipeline infrastructures (e.g., in 
Wyoming, Colorado) but production at these new sites will not be sufficient to compensate that decline. 
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Because of the coming depletion of the private sources in the mid-continent region and the planned 
termination of federal sales, the country is expected to become a net importer in the near future (NRC, 
2010). 
Lastly, the global helium industry exhibits a concentrated market structure as supply depends on a 
small number of separation plants worldwide. Though competition exists in the U.S. industry, this is not 
the case in other countries where all the local plants are controlled by the national oil company (e.g., 
Algeria, Qatar, Russia). The degree of industry concentration is thus expected to increase as global 
helium production shifts outside the U.S. The three largest players together controlled 42.9 percent of 
the global helium separation capacity in 2013 and will control up to 47.5 percent in 2018 (IHS, 2014). 
This cumulative share could possibly increase to 63 percent after 2020 if the Russian project is 
developed at full capacity. Therefore, any partial equilibrium model of the world helium market should 
capture the oligopolistic nature of that industry. 
3. Model 
In this section, we first present an overview of our modeling framework. Then, we present a 
detailed description of the market participants and their associated optimization problems. Lastly, a 
final subsection discusses the solution strategy. 
3.1 Overview 
The present analysis is based on the World Helium Model (WHM), a detailed partial equilibrium 
model that applies principles from game theory and optimization to simulate the global helium 
marketplace. The WHM is formulated as a deterministic, discrete-time, finite-horizon oligopoly model 
that explicitly takes into account the imperfectly competitive structure of the world helium industry. It 
portrays the strategic interactions between two main types of suppliers: the U.S. federal government – 
represented by the BLM – that operates the federal helium reserve, and the private firms separating 
helium from natural gas. To account for the heterogeneous nature of the constraints and decisions 
problems observed in the private sector, the private sector is further disaggregated using a typology of 
three mutually exclusive groups of firms: (i) the existing companies processing helium from 
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neighboring gas fields where future production cannot increase, (ii) the U.S. firms with plants 
connected to the BLM’s storage system, and (iii) the firms that can invest in new helium processing 
equipment. 
In the WHM, all individual suppliers are depicted as profit-maximizers under certain constraints, 
with a distinctive revenue and cost structure for each supplier type. Consistent with the industrial 
organization observed in the helium markets, the WHM assumes that some of these agents can behave à 
la Cournot and exert market power (by withholding supplies to force up prices for larger profits) 
whereas the others are price-takers. The behavior and strategy sets of these agents are further detailed in 
the next subsection. The market equilibrium modeled in the WHM emerges from the joint solution of 
the separate optimization problems faced by the suppliers taken together with market-clearing 
conditions. 
3.2 Formulation of the World Helium Model 7 
We consider a discrete time model with periods { }0,1,..., Ht T∈  that have a standard duration of one 
year and aim at modeling the decisions to be taken in years { }T: 1,..., Ht T∈ =  where HT  is the time 
horizon. We also let { }1,..., BLMT  denote the first periods during which the BLM is allowed to conduct 
commercial operations (i.e., these operations cease at the end of the year BLMT , with BLM HT T< ). 
Hereafter, we assume that the time horizon HT  is large. 
We let J  denote the set of all the suppliers. This set is decomposed into mutually exclusive 
subsets { } 1 2 3:J BLM J J J= ∪ ∪ ∪  where the subsets 1J , 2J  and 3J  respectively denote: the subgroup of 
the private companies processing helium from neighboring gas fields where future production cannot 
increase, the U.S. firms with plants connected to the BLM’s storage system, and the private suppliers 
that are capable of expanding their future annual production of helium. We let jtq  denote the quantity of 
helium supplied by agent j  in year t . 
                                                 
7 Please note that, to ease readability, a nomenclature summarizing the notation is detailed presented in Appendix A. 
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In the remainder of this subsection, we explicitly write out the market-clearing conditions and the 
optimization problem for each individual market participant, including the objective function and 
constraints. We use the following convention: if in the optimization problem of an agent j , a variable 
has an asterisk, this indicates that this variable is exogenous to the agent’s problem but endogenous to 
the market model. For example, a price-taking agent naïvely views the price variable as fixed even 
though the full market model equilibrates price to equate supply with demand.  
a – The demand side 
The world demand is modeled using a linear demand function. We assume that td  the total 
quantity of helium demanded in year t  for all uses (e.g., cryogenics; pressurizing and purging; 
controlled atmospheres; welding cover gas; leak detection; breathing mixtures) is a strictly decreasing 
function of the helium price tp , an increasing function of the lagged consumption, and is 
parameterized by an exogenous term ty  representing the aggregate real income: 
1t t t td y p dα γ λ −= − + ,  Tt∀ ∈ , 0d  given.     (1) 
where the income coefficient α , the price coefficient γ  and the lagged coefficient λ  are empirically-
determined parameters (with 0α > , 0γ >  and 0 1λ≤ < ). 
From that definition, it is straightforward to define the linear inverse demand functions that gives, 
in each year t , the willingness-to-pay the price tp  as a function of both the present and lagged 
consumption levels: ( )1,t t t tp P d d −= .  
b – The market clearing conditions 
The market-clearing conditions tie the separate helium producers’ optimization problems defined 
hereafter to the simplified representation of the demand side. The market clearing condition at time t  
ensures balance between global supply and demand by forcing demand and supply to equilibrate:  
j
t t
j J
q d
∈
= ,      Tt∀ ∈ .     (2) 
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c – The BLM  
This agent controls the extraction operations conducted at the FHR. We let BLMtq  denote the non-
negative quantity extracted and sold to commercial users by the BLM in each year t . We use the 
convention that the BLM’s remaining reserve tR  is measured at the end of year t  (i.e., once the 
quantity BLMtq  has been extracted and sold). At the end of 2013 (year 0), the BLM is endowed with the 
initial reserve 0R . 
We assume that the BLM is allowed to conduct commercial operations during BLMT  years after 
which its reserve level must be equal to R  (i.e., the 3 Bcf allocated to non-commercial uses stipulated in 
the 2013 Act).  
In this paper, we consider two alternative extraction behaviors for the BLM. The first one follows 
the rapid extraction path stipulated in the 2013 Act whereas the second one is derived from the solution 
of on an optimization problem.  
The rapid extraction trajectory in the 2013 Act (BLM – Model I) 
Recall that the 2013 Act imposes a predetermined and rapid extraction trajectory: it instructs the 
BLM to offer for sale in each year a quantity of helium set at the maximum total production capacity of 
the federal helium system until the 3 Bcf reserve threshold is attained. With that rapid extraction path, 
the desired reserve threshold is attained in year 9 (see Figure 1). So, we set 9BLMT =  years and consider 
the following extraction trajectory: 
BLM – Model I ( 9BLMT = )  
 BLM BLMt tq Q= ,      { }1,..., 1BLMt T∀ ∈ − ,  (BLM I–1) 
 ( )1
0 '' 1
BLMTBLM BLM
t tt
q R R Q
−
=
= − − ,    for BLMt T= , (BLM I–2) 
 0BLMtq = ,       { }1,...,BLM Ht T T∀ ∈ + . (BLM I–3)  
where BLMtQ  is the annual production ceiling of the federal helium system in year t  indicated in Figure 
1. Equation (BLM I–1) compels the BLM to offer for sale in each year a quantity of helium set at the 
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maximum production capacity during the period 2024-2021 (i.e., in years 1 to 8). In year 9, equation 
(BLM I–2) imposes the BLM to extract the residual quantity allocated to commercial operations (i.e., 
the difference between the total amount allocated to commercial operations ( )0R R−  and the cumulated 
volumes extracted during the previous years). The BLM is then compelled to cease its supplies in 
subsequent years (equation (BLM I–3)).  
The case of a possibly slower extraction trajectory with Cournot behavior (BLM – Model II) 
As one can question the rationality of that imposed “as-fast-as-technically-possible” extraction 
trajectory, we explore the economics of an alternative policy prescription that would allow the BLM to 
operate over a possibly longer horizon of BLMT  years, with 9BLMT ≥ . Under that alternative mandate, the 
BLM is no longer compelled to adopt the fastest extraction path and can consider possibly slower 
trajectories. One has thus to clarify: (i) how the geological considerations at the Cliffside reservoir 
restrict the player’s decisions and (ii) the behavior of that player.  
Regarding the former, the trajectory in Figure 1 suggests that, in each year t , the production 
ceiling at the Cliffside reservoir can be approximated by an empirically-determined linear function of 
1tR −  the reserve available when year t  begins: 1tRη µ− +  where η  and µ  are two positive parameters.8 
We thus proceed, assuming that in each year t  the quantity extracted by the BLM cannot exceed the 
value determined by that linear function. 
Regarding the latter, the policy objectives mentioned in the 2013 Act explicitly stipulate that the 
BLM’s sales must be conducted so as to “maximize the total financial return to the taxpayer” (Helium 
Stewardship Act, 2013) which suggests that the BLM can be modeled as a profit-maximizing agent. 
Furthermore, even if the BLM’s market share in the international market is compelled to diminish in the 
future because of the depletion of its reserve, the BLM is likely to remain a significant player during the 
                                                 
8 The assumption of a linear relation between the annual production capacity of an underground reservoir and the remaining 
reserve at the beginning of the year is frequently retained in models of the oil industry (e.g., Griffin and Teece, 1982). 
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early years of the planning horizon. Therefore, we assume that this agent is able to behave à la Cournot 
and thus to assess how the agents’ extraction decisions are modifying equilibrium prices.  
We thus consider the following optimization problem. 
BLM – Model II ( 9BLMT ≥ )  
Max
BLM
tq
 ( )* *1 1
1
,
BLMT
t BLM BLM BLM BLM BLM
BLM BLM t t t t t BLM t
t
P q q q q C qβ − −− −
=
 Π = + + −   (BLM II–1)  
s.t. 1
BLM
t tq Rη µ−≤ + ,    { }1,..., BLMt T∀ ∈ ,  (BLM II–2) 
 
1
BLM
t t tR R q−= − ,    { }1,..., BLMt T∀ ∈ , 0R  given, (BLM II–3) 
 
BLMT
R R= ,  (BLM II–4) 
 0BLMtq ≥       { }1,..., BLMt T∀ ∈ . (BLM II–5) 
where BLMβ  is the discount factor, 
*BLM
tq
−  is used as a short notation for the aggregate quantity of 
helium supplied by the rivals, BLMC  is the unit extraction cost, tR  is the reserve in year t . The objective 
function (BLM II–1) is the discounted sum of the BLM’s annual profits, which are the result of 
revenues from sales minus production costs. Consistent with the Cournot framework, the aggregate 
quantity *BLMtq
−  is exogenous to the BLM’s optimization problem. The geological constraint (BLM II–
2) stipulates that, in each year, the quantity extracted cannot be larger than the production ceiling. 
Equation (BLM II–3) is the reserve accounting identity that keeps track of the BLM reserves. The 
constraint (BLM II–4) imposes the remaining reserve at the end of the BLM’s commercial operations to 
attain the targeted reserve threshold.  
d – The helium separators 
We now examine the behavior of the private firms that separate helium from the natural gas 
extracted at neighboring fields. These market participants are modeled as profit-maximizing agents. In 
each year t , they do not directly control the flow of the helium-rich gas extracted from the underground 
reservoirs but they do decide the quantities of helium separated from that flow and sold in the global 
marketplace.  
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We successively present the optimization problems for each of the three distinct types of private 
helium suppliers. 
The existing separators with non-increasing future helium-processing capacities 
We first consider the subgroup 1J J⊂  that gathers all the helium producers who process helium 
from neighboring natural gas fields where there will be no further increase in annual production in the 
future. Accordingly, we let jtH  denote the maximum quantity of helium that can be extracted by 
producer j  in year t . This quantity is determined by two factors: the volume of natural gas supplied to 
j ’s separation plant, and the helium concentration in that feed gas. As none of these factors are 
controlled by j , we assume that the trajectory of jtH  is exogenously determined.
9 We also assume that 
the installed capacity at each of these helium separation plants is sufficient to process 
j
tH  thereby 
eliminating the need for further capacity expansion at these plants.  
The sizes of the plants in that category are heterogeneous as they include some very big players 
such as the current world’s largest helium production facility (Exxon’s LaBarge Shute Creek in 
Wyoming) and smaller ones (e.g., the helium plants at the Keyes field in Oklahoma and at Odolanów in 
Poland). While it seems natural to posit that the big players are likely to behave à la Cournot and could 
conceivably exert market power, that assumption makes little sense for the smaller ones that are more 
likely to behave as price-taking agents. Hence, there is a producer-specific behavior for each agent in 
that subgroup. The agents and their individual behaviors will be clarified in the application section. 
The producer maximizes profits resulting from selling helium net of the costs. In algebraic terms, 
the problem is to solve the following optimization program: 
Max
i
tq
 ( ) ( )* * *1 1
T
1 ,t j j j j e jj j j t j t t t t t j t
t
p P q q q q C qβ δ δ − −− −
∈
 Π = − + + + −   (J1–1) 
s.t. j j
t tq H≤ ,     Tt∀ ∈ ,  (J1–2) 
                                                 
9 Hence, we follow Epple and Lave (1980) and assume that helium-specific issues (e.g., prices, supply, demand) play no role in 
the upstream decisions taken by the natural gas producers who supply the helium separation units. 
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 0jtq ≥ ,       Tt∀ ∈ .  (J1–3) 
where jβ  is the players’ discount factor,10 
*j
tq
−  is the aggregate quantity of helium supplied by the 
rivals, and ejC  is the unit cost incurred to purchase and refine crude helium from the natural gas 
producers. The objective function (J1–1) represents the discounted sum of the producer’s annual profits 
which are the revenues from helium sales net of the costs. In that function, the producer-specific binary 
parameter jδ  indicates whether that agent has a perfect competitive behavior ( 0jδ = ) or a Cournot 
oligopolistic behavior ( 1jδ = ). In the former case, the player naïvely considers the price variables 
*
tp  to 
be exogenous to his optimization problem whereas in the latter case the player explicitly considers the 
inverse demand functions ( ).tP  in the objective function. The constraints (J1–2) state that helium sales 
at time t  cannot exceed the maximum available quantity jtH  at that date. If the solution of that program 
is such that, in a given year t , the constraint (J1–2) is not binding, the associated slack 0j jt tH q− ≥  can 
be interpreted as a waste, as that quantity of helium is not separated and will end up being vented in the 
atmosphere when the fuel gas is burned. 
The U.S. separators connected to the BLM infrastructure 
The subgroup 2J J⊂  includes the private producers in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas that process 
helium from the natural gas streams extracted from the Reichel, Hugoton, Panoma, and Panhandle 
fields. Natural gas production at these fields is either plateauing or already steadily declining because of 
forthcoming geological depletion. Compared to the producers in 1J , the agents in 2J  are physically 
connected to the federal pipeline infrastructure. They can thus stockpile helium for later sale using the 
private helium storage service offered at cost by the BLM.11 The provision of this private storage 
service will cease once the BLM’s commercial operations have been terminated. 
                                                 
10 As the players in our model do not operate in the same region and under the same economic conditions, it makes sense to 
suppose that they can discount their profits using possibly different rates. 
11 Because of the specific structure retained for these storage contracts, the BLM is compelled to use a cost-reflective pricing 
policy for this service and thus cannot strategically use the provision of that service to maximize its own profits (NRC, 2000). 
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Neglecting capacity constraints on the injection and withdrawal operations at the storage site, the 
behavior of a producer in 2J  can be modeled using the following optimization problem: 
, , , ,
Max
i j j i i
t t t t tq h i w v
 ( ) ( )* * *1 1
T
1 ,t j j j j j e j i j w j jj j j t j t t t t t t j t j t j t t
t
p P q q q q q C h C i C w S vβ δ δ − −− −
∈
  Π = − + + + − − − −    (J2–1) 
s.t. j j
t th H≤ ,       Tt∀ ∈ ,  (J2–2) 
 j j j j
t t t tq i h w+ = + ,      Tt∀ ∈ , (J2–3) 
 
1
j j j j
t t t tv v i w−= + − ,     Tt∀ ∈ , 0
jv  given, (J2–4) 
 0jtv = ,       BLMt T∀ ≥ ,  (J2–5) 
 0jtq ≥ ,  0
j
th ≥ ,  0
j
tv ≥ ,  0
j
ti ≥ ,  0
j
tw ≥ , Tt∀ ∈ .  (J2–6) 
where ijC , 
w
jC  and S  are the unit cost parameters associated with storage operations and the non-
negative decision variables are: jtq  the annual sales, 
j
th  the annual quantity of helium separated from 
the stream of natural gas, jtv  the total volume of helium stored at the end of the year (the initial storage 
0
jv  is given), jti  (respectively 
j
tw ) the annual quantity of helium injected into (respectively withdrawn 
from) the storage site. The objective function (J2–1) is the discounted sum of the producer’s annual 
profits, which are the result of revenues from sales minus the sum of e jj tC h  the total cost to purchase 
crude helium from the natural gas producers and refine it, i jj tC i  the total cost of the injection operations 
conducted at the storage site, w jj tC w  the total cost to extract and purify the helium extracted from the 
storage site, and jtS v  the storage cost. Again, the binary parameter jδ  indicates whether that producer 
has a perfect competitive behavior ( 0jδ = ) or a Cournot oligopolistic behavior ( 1jδ = ). The constraints 
(J2–2) state that production of helium from natural gas at time t  cannot exceed the annual production 
ceiling jtH . The equation (J2–3) is a balance identity that states that, in each year, the sum of the sales 
plus the quantity injected into the storage is equal to the sum of the quantity obtained from natural gas 
separation plus the quantity withdrawn from the storage site. The equation (J2–4) is an accounting 
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identity that keeps track of the storage volume. The constraint (J2–5) imposes the termination of the 
storage operations at the end of the BLM’s time horizon.  
The separators with possibly new helium-processing capacities 
The subgroup 3J J⊂  gathers the firms that are capable of investing to further expand their future 
helium production. The list includes all the existing plants where capacity expansion investments can be 
considered to increase output beyond current levels (e.g., in Algeria, Qatar) and the greenfield projects 
aimed at constructing a new helium plant near untapped helium-rich deposits (e.g., in Siberia, 
Wyoming).  
Each producer j  in 3J  is modeled as a profit-maximizing agent who has to decide in each year t  
its annual sales and jtk  the physical investment (in flow unit) in production capacity. In each year t , its 
output can neither exceed the total installed capacity 1
j
tK −  at the end of the preceding year nor the 
maximum available quantity of helium contained in the extracted gas jtH . We also assume: (i) that an 
investment jtk  decided in year t  becomes productive at the end of that year, and (ii) that the 
depreciation rate of the total installed capacity is negligible.  
Each producer j  in 3J  is thus assumed to solve the following optimization program: 
,
Max
i i
t tq k
 ( ) ( )* * *1 1
T
1 ,t j j j j e j k jj j j t j t t t t t j t j t
t
p P q q q q C q C kβ δ δ − −− −
∈
  Π = − + + + − −    (J3–1) 
s.t. 1
j j j
t t tK K k−= + ,     Tt∀ ∈ , 0jK  given, (J3–2) 
 
1
j j
t tq K −≤ ,      Tt∀ ∈ ,  (J3–3) 
 j j
t tq H≤ ,      Tt∀ ∈ ,  (J3-4) 
 0jtq ≥ ,   0
j
tk ≥ ,     Tt∀ ∈ .  (J3–5) 
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where k
jC  is the unit cost of a capacity increment. The objective function is the discounted sum of the 
producer’s annual profits.12 Again, the binary parameter jδ  indicates whether that producer adopts a 
perfect competitive behavior ( 0jδ = ) or a Cournot oligopolistic behavior ( 1jδ = ). The constraint (J3–2) 
is a state equation that describes the evolution of the total installed capacity. In each year t , the annual 
output is bounded by the capacity constraint (J3–3) and (ii) the exogenous annual production ceiling jtH  
(cf., constraint (J3–4)). 
3.3 Solution strategy 
We consider an open-loop information structure and adopt the Nash equilibrium as the solution 
concept. In an open-loop equilibria, the players’ information sets contain the current calendar date and 
initial values of the state variables and each player has to choose its control actions as a function of time 
only (Salant, 1982; Dockner et al., 2000). The underlying problem thus amounts to solving a one-stage 
game. By definition, the vector ( )1 J,..., ,...,jx x x x=★ ★ ★ ★  is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the WHM if 
no market participant has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his equilibrium actions, given his 
opponents’ actions, i.e.:  
( ) ( )1 1 1 J,..., , , ,...,j j j j jx x x x x x− +Π ≥ Π★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ,  j jx∀ ∈ Ω , j J∀ ∈ ,    (3) 
where jx  denotes the vector of the decision variables of player j  specified in his respective 
optimization problem, and jΩ  represents the set of his feasible actions (i.e., the player’s feasible set 
which is defined by the constraints in his optimization program). 
Because of the size of the WHM, the derivation of an analytic solution would be burdensome. 
Instead, the following numerical procedure can be considered for solving this Nash equilibrium 
problem. In the WHM, each market participant has to solve a convex mathematical programming 
problem since each player’s objective is to maximize his profit given a set of constraints (such as 
                                                 
12 The planning horizon HT  is chosen to be large enough (i.e., about 40 years) to approximate the infinite-horizon problem. As 
our analysis concentrates on the first BLMT  years (with BLMT  in the range 9–25 years), the objective function of this agent 
does not include a salvage value at the end of the planning horizon. 
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production or capacity constraints) and the endogenous actions of the other market participants. For 
each market participant, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient for an 
optimal solution of the player’s specific maximization problem and thus constitute the player’s first-
order equilibrium conditions.13 The essence of the numerical approach is to find an equilibrium that 
simultaneously satisfies each market participant’s KKT conditions for profit-maximization together 
with the demand equations (1) and the market-clearing conditions (2). As shown in Haurie et al. (2012) 
and Gabriel et al. (2012a), these conditions together define an instance of a mixed linear 
complementarity problem,14 a particular class of mathematical programming problems for which 
efficient solution algorithms exist. In the application discussed in section 4, the complementarity 
problem associated with the WHM has been implemented in GAMS and solved with the 
complementarity solver PATH (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995; Ferris and Munson, 2000) to find Nash 
equilibria under various assumptions. 
4. Application 
4.1 Data and counterfactual scenarios 
a – Data and empirical specification 
The model described above is parameterized to represent the international helium market and be 
consistent with observed data.  
                                                 
13 For the sake of brevity, the straightforward but tedious derivations of the players’ individual KKT conditions are omitted in 
this manuscript. 
14 Technically, a mixed linear complementarity problem is defined by a series of parameters structured into four matrixes  
(
11
n n
M
×∈ℝ , 
22
m m
M
×∈ℝ , 
12
n m
M
×∈ℝ  and 
21
m n
M
×∈ℝ ) and two vectors (
1
n
q ∈ℝ  and 
2
m
q ∈ℝ )  and aims at finding 
two vectors 
1
n
z ∈ℝ  and 
2
m
z ∈ℝ  such that the following four conditions hold: (i) 
1 11 1 12 2
0q M z M z+ + ≥ ; (ii) 
2 21 1 22 2
0q M z M z+ + = ; (iii) 
1
0z ≥  and (iv) ( )
1 1 11 1 12 2
0Tz q M z M z+ + =   where T  is the transpose operator. This 
class of problem has extensively been studied in the mathematical programming literature and we refer to Cottle et al. (1992) 
for a comprehensive presentation of this problem, its properties and the specific algorithmic procedures that can solve it.  
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We first clarify the planning horizon retained in the analysis. We aim at comparing several 
solutions: the one obtained when the BLM is compelled to use the rapid depletion trajectory (i.e., the 
BLM Model I) and the ones whereby that agent is allowed to conduct commercial operations during an 
extended period of BLMT  years. Here, BLMT  is in the range 9-25 years and the selection of the date BLMT  
will be further discussed below. For the moment, we simply note that, because of the presence of an 
adjustment lag in the helium demand function, this range imposes a planning horizon that at least 
encompasses the enlarged period of 26 years that follows the implementation of the 2013 Act. In this 
paper, the model is systematically solved over a longer time horizon. As with all finite time horizon 
formulations, players in the WHM could avoid investing in incremental production capacity near the 
end of the modeling time frame because the remaining duration could possibly be too short to recoup 
that cost. This behavior may lead to the prediction of unacceptably low outputs (and thus high prices) 
near the end of the planning horizon. To overcome this problem, we solve the model over a 37-year 
horizon that starts at the end of 2013 (year 0) and ends in 2050 (year T ).  
Prices and costs are in constant 2014 dollars. To the best of our knowledge, there are no recent 
econometric studies of the demand for helium that can be tapped for parameter estimates. Thus, we 
estimated a linear demand equation. This empirical model posits that global helium consumption is 
explained by the aggregate real GDP in high and upper middle-income economies, the real price of 
helium, and the lagged consumption. Data sources, assumptions, and estimation results are detailed and 
commented on in Appendix B. To conduct market simulations, an exogenous future trajectory of that 
real GDP is needed. In this paper, we assume that the future real income will follow a constant rate of 
growth path. The posited growth rates are presented hereafter.  
On the supply side, Table 1 enumerates, for each type of player discussed in the preceding section, 
the individual agents considered in the present analysis and clarifies their posited strategic behavior. 
This list has been derived from the descriptive analyses detailed in IHS (2014) and in a professional 
journal (Gasworld, 2015, 2016). In this paper, all the players that are capable of producing more than 
200 million cubic feet (MMcf) per year are supposed to behave à la Cournot while the others are 
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modeled as price-taking agents.15 The specific cost and geological parameters used for each player are 
detailed in Appendix C.  
We assume that all the private players located in OECD countries consider a real discount rate of 6 
percent and that the rate used by players operating in non-OECD regions is 10 percent.16 A real discount 
rate of 3 percent is used for the U.S. BLM. 
Table 1. Players 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
b – Counterfactual scenarios 
We investigate the possible future of the world helium industry through a series of four 
counterfactual scenarios that are structured along two dimensions. First, we consider two alternative 
demand trajectories by changing the value of the real income parameters in the demand equation (1). 
These two cases are chosen to reflect a possible future exogenous increase in demand: 
(i) the “base-case” trajectory is aimed at exploring the consequences of an autonomous 
annual rate of growth of 2.5 percent for the real income trajectory, which is the average 
rate observed between 1973 and 2013 in these economies. 
(ii) the “Slow Growth” trajectory assumes that the total real GDP of the high and upper 
middle-income economies will grow at an annual rate of 1.5 percent. 
A second dimension of the analysis explores the role of future Russian supplies. At present, Russia 
operates a unique separation unit in Orenburg that has a relatively modest nameplate capacity (230 
MMcf per year) but it is likely that Russia could greatly increase its output over the next two decades. 
                                                 
15 Global consumption attained 6,309.3 MMcf in 2013 (source: USGS). The market share of a player endowed with a capacity 
that does not exceed 200 MMcf per year thus represented at most 3.2% of the world market that year. In the present analysis, 
we assume that these small players cannot exert market power. 
16 For the players located in OECD countries, the discount rate is based on the data assembled by Prof. A. Damodaran on the 
cost of capital incurred by publicly listed companies (http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/). As the firms operating in non-
OECD countries are not publicly listed (e.g., Sonatrach, Qatar Petroleum), the posited real discount rate is the one used by 
Massol and Banal-Estañol (2014) in their analysis of the gas processing projects located in non-OECD countries. 
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The country’s ambition is to build a large helium plant in Eastern Siberia that could commence 
operations during the year 2021. If fully developed, the capacity of that project could attain 2,380 
MMcf per year, which would make it the world’s largest source of helium. Nevertheless, this project 
will be phased and market analysts believe that it could experience delays because of its remote location 
(Gasworld, 2015, 2016; Anderson, 2017). The present analysis thus considers two cases that reflect 
possible alternative trajectories for the country’s production ceiling in constraint (J3–4): 
(i) the “Ambitious Russian” (AR) trajectory assumes five successive phases, each providing 
an incremental processing capacity of 476 MMcf per year. The first phase is scheduled to 
commence operations in mid-2021 and the four subsequent ones will follow in mid-2025, 
mid-2029, mid-2033, and mid-2037.  
(ii) The “Delayed Russian” (DR) trajectory also considers five phases with capacity 
increments of the same magnitude but the dates of the last four phases are postponed to 
mid-2027, mid-2033, mid-2039, and mid-2045 respectively. 
For each of these four scenarios, we successively solve the two variants of the oligopolistic 
equilibrium defined by the two alternative behaviors posited for the U.S. BLM (cf., models I and II in 
section 3.2). 
c – The duration of the less stringent mandate 
In Model II, the BLM is allowed to operate during a number of years BLMT  chosen in the range 9-
25 years. Though we have solved the WHM for each of these possible years, the discussion below 
concentrates on three noteworthy cases: BLMT = 13, 18 or 23 years. These three cases epitomize the 
market outcomes obtained with BLM Model II. Indeed, we found that an extended mandate of 13 years 
maximizes the average net present value of the U.S. BLM’s future profits obtained under the four 
scenarios and could thus represent the best option for a privately-managed BLM. With an extended 
mandate of 23 years, the average global social welfare obtained under the four scenarios (measured 
over the first 26 years and discounted using a social real rate of 3 percent) attains its highest value 
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which suggests that the choice BLMT = 23 years could be interpreted as a socially desirable choice. The 
case BLMT = 18 years is aimed at detailing an intermediate situation between the two polar cases. 
4.2 Results and discussion 
We shall now compare the solutions for the two possible mandates for the U.S. BLM: either the 
current one under which the U.S. BLM is imposed to cease its commercial operations as soon as 
technically possible (i.e., in 2022) or the less stringent one that would allow the U.S. BLM to freely 
operate as a Cournot player during an extended periods of either 13, 18 or 23 years. Our analysis first 
focuses on the impacts on the U.S. BLM, then examines the market outcomes, and finally investigates 
the social consequences.  
a – The depletion of the Federal Helium Reserve 
To begin with, it is instructive to compare, for each scenario, the BLM’s optimal extraction 
trajectories obtained using each mandate. These paths are shown graphically in Figure 2. Observe that 
whatever the scenario under scrutiny, the depletion trajectories of the Federal Reserve obtained with the 
less stringent mandates BLM II are substantially slower than the “as-fast-as-technically-possible” path 
currently imposed on the U.S. BLM. The remaining reserve at the end of year 2022 is larger than the 3 
Bcf threshold and on the order of respectively 5.0–5.6, 6.3–8.7 and 6.6–10.0 Bcf when the BLM is 
allowed to operate as a profit-maximizing agent during an extended period of respectively 13, 18 and 23 
years. This finding confirms that the rapid extraction policy BLM I is not maximizing the total financial 
return to the U.S. federal budget, thereby generating an opportunity cost. The profits gained by the U.S. 
BLM under the various scenarios will be further examined in the sequel. 
Figure 2. The BLM’s remaining reserve at the end of the year (in MMcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
b – The market outcomes 
We shall now examine how the adoption of a less stringent mandate modifies the market outcomes 
and the other players’ decisions.  
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Global helium consumption 
Future global consumption trajectories for the four mandates under each of the four scenarios are 
shown graphically in Figure 3. As can be expected, a less rapid extraction trajectory at the Federal 
Helium Reserve reduces the total world consumption of helium during the early years and increases it 
after 2022. Overall, the “as-fast-as-technically-possible” policy (i.e., the one derived from BLM Model 
I, shown by the dashed lines in blue) artificially stimulates booming consumption figures during the 
early years followed by a period of relative stagnation after 2022. In contrast, the less stringent 
mandates based on BLM Model II generate smoothly growing consumption trajectories (particularly if 
the BLM is allowed to operate during a long period of either 18 or 23 years). 
Figure 3. Annual helium consumption (in MMcf)  
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ] 
During the years 2014-2022, the cumulated consumption figures are in the range 67.9–68.9 Bcf 
when the BLM follows the “as-fast-as-technically-possible” extraction path and in the range 65.9–67.0 
Bcf when an extended BLM mandate of 13 years is implemented. One can note that the difference 
between the two models (i.e., 1.9–2.0 Bcf) is smaller than the difference in the BLM’s remaining 
reserves at the end of year 2022. This finding suggests that the adoption of a different mandate for the 
BLM modifies the supply decisions of the other producers. This issue will be further examined below. 
Market price 
We now examine the future equilibrium prices in dollar per thousand cubic feet ($/McF). The 
paths depicted in Figure 4 convey a series of interesting findings. First, as can be expected, the 
trajectories obtained when the BLM is allowed to operate as a Cournot player (BLM Model II) exhibit 
higher prices during the initial years and lower ones during the years 2022-2025. During the years 
2014-2019, the average market price obtained under the BLM Model II is the range of $153.2 to $180.4 
per Mcf which is larger than the $138.6–$145.7 interval obtained when the BLM follows the “as-fast-
as-technically-possible” extraction path. During the years 2022-2025, this is the opposite: depending on 
the scenario, the average equilibrium price is between $231.1 and $298.6 per Mcf under the BLM 
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Model I and on the order of $196.5 to $240.8 per Mcf when that agent behaves à la Cournot. This 
outcome is consistent with the inter-temporal profit-maximizing behavior of a Cournot player who 
prefers to reduce its output during the initial years to obtain higher prices.  
Second, one can note that, under a less stringent mandate of either 18 years or 23 years, the 
magnitude of the price shocks that follow the termination of the BLM’s commercial operations is 
attenuated. Lastly, observe that whatever the mandate given to the U.S. BLM, and whatever the 
scenario under scrutiny, the helium market price which was equal to 200$/Mcf in 2013 (year 0) declines 
over the next year and then slowly rises. Unsurprisingly, that decline is more pronounced when the 
BLM is compelled to adopt the rapid depletion path, but extraction decisions at the BLM only partially 
explain the observed price decline because it is also observed (though with a lower magnitude) when 
the BLM behaves à la Cournot and supplies drastically reduced volumes in the early years. In fact, this 
price pattern is a characteristic result of incorporating an adjustment lag in the helium demand function. 
Recall that in 2013 there was a global shortage of helium, but there was only a minor impact on 
consumption figures by the then-prevailing high helium price. Because of the adjustment lag, the 2014 
market equilibrium not only reflects the contemporary supply-demand situation but also those of the 
preceding years. Beyond that technical remark, it is interesting to note that this pattern is also consistent 
with the current industrial reality: since 2014, market analysts in professional publications have 
recurrently portrayed an “oversupply” situation and have reported lower helium selling prices than the 
ones observed before 2014.17 
Figure 4. Equilibrium prices (in $/Mcf)  
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE ] 
Behavior of the other producers 
We now examine how the BLM’s rapid extraction trajectory (i.e., BLM Model I) is impacting the 
rivals’ decisions. Three interesting series of findings can be derived from the detailed examination of 
the individual players’ supply policies. 
                                                 
17 Cf., the descriptive analyses on the state of the helium market published in Gasworld (2015, 2016). 
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First, we examine the supply behavior of the existing private separators in group 1J . Table 2 
indicates that for Utah 1 and Wyoming 1 the market equilibrium is such that the constraints (J1–2) are 
not binding in the early years. Recall that observing a positive slack 0j jt tH q− >  reveals that the player 
at hand does not capture as much helium as technically possible during that year and thus represents a 
net waste as the quantities of helium not separated will be vented in the atmosphere when the gas is 
burned.18 The figures in Table 2 reveal that, whatever the scenario under scrutiny, the obligation to use 
a rapid extraction trajectory at the U.S. BLM (i.e., Model I) systematically generates a larger waste of 
helium compared to the ones obtained under an extended mandate (BLM Model II). Under the BLM 
Model I, the total waste of helium is between 640.0 and 660.8 MMcf. The adoption of a less stringent 
mandate of respectively 13, 18 or 23 years lowers that range to 320.0–538.0, 163.4–320.0 or 106.8–
320.0 MMcf respectively. Opting for that latter mandate (and preferably with a long duration) is thus 
preferable to conserve the resource. 
Table 2. Annual helium venting by the firms in group 1J  (in MMcf)  
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ] 
                                                 
18 The rationale for that venting is specific to each of these two players. For Utah 1, the market prices observed in the early 
years are strictly lower than the player’s unit cost (155.0 $/Mcf) which explains why this price-taking agent finds it rational to 
cease helium separation on these occasions. For Wyoming 1, prices are always larger than the unit cost (42.8 $/Mcf) but this 
player behaves à la Cournot and can thus exert market power. Hence, he considers a marginal revenue function that varies 
with its own supplies. In year 1, the marginal revenue is the sum of three terms: (i) ( )*1 1 1 0,j jP q q d−+  the price of the 
marginal unit supplied in year 1, (ii) ( )*11 1 1 0 1
1
1
,j j j j
j
P
q q q d q
q γ
−∂ −+ =
∂
 the marginal impact the sale of a marginal unit in 
 year 1 has on the price obtained that year times the total quantity supplied that year, and (iii) 
( )* *22 2 2 1 1 2
1
,j j j j j jj jj
P
q q q q q q
q
λβ β
γ
− −∂ + + =
∂
 the discounted marginal impact the sale of a marginal unit in year 1 will have on 
the price obtained in year 2 times the total quantity that will be supplied by that player in year 2. Simplifying, the marginal 
revenue function of that player in year 1 is: ( )*1 1 0 1 1 22j j j jjMR y d q q qα λ β λ γ−= + − − + . In the slow growth scenarios, the 
other players’ decisions 
*
1
jq−  are such that there systematically exists a pair of positive supply decision 1
jq  and 2
jq  for that 
player such that the equation 1 42.8
jMR =  holds with 1 1
j jq H<  and 2 2
j jq H= . 
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Second, it is instructive to examine the private storage decisions taken by the U.S. separators 
connected to the BLM infrastructure (i.e., subgroup 2J ). An inspection of Figure 5 shows that there are 
marked differences in the private inventory levels observed during the initial years, depending on the 
BLM behavior. Note that, whatever the scenario, there are rapidly declining inventory levels when the 
BLM behaves à la Cournot. In contrast, the U.S. private inventory levels are increased during the first 
three years when the BLM implements the rapid extraction trajectory (cf., the dashed lines in blue). At 
the end of year 2015, that private inventory attains 1.8 Bcf under the base-case scenario and 1.5 Bcf 
under the “slow growth” demand scenario. The BLM’s rapid extraction path (and the depressed prices it 
generates during the initial years) thus creates profitable storage opportunities for private separators. 
This pattern is consistent with recent industrial evidence: the private inventory levels reported by the 
USGS (2015) have slightly increased since the implementation of the 2013 Act. From an aggregate 
perspective, note that the behavior of the private separators attenuates the price decline caused by the 
BLM’s rapid extraction path during the first five years. Nevertheless, one may question the social 
efficiency of that policy as the cost of the intertemporal arbitrage operations conducted by private 
separators is likely to be larger than that of the BLM because of a combination of higher discount rates 
and higher storage cost (recall that the BLM’s injection costs are sunk).  
Figure 5. Volume of storage owned by private producers at the end of the year (MMcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE ] 
Third, we also inspect the investment decisions taken by the separators in subgroup 3J . Figure 6 
(respectively Figure 7) reports the cumulated capacity additions decided in Canada (respectively Qatar) 
under the various mandates. As a benchmark, these figures also report the cumulated capacity additions 
that would have been needed to process the exogenously-determined flow of helium jtH  (that curve is 
labeled production ceiling).19 We do not report the investment decisions of the other players in 3J  as we 
found that modifying the BLM’s mandate has no impact on their investment decisions.  
                                                 
19 At time t , this curve is simply obtained by plotting 1 0
j j
tCK K+ −  where { }1: max ,j j jt t tCK H CK −=  with 0 0j jCK K= . 
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Figure 6. Canada’s cumulated investments in new separation equipment (MMcf per year) 
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE ] 
Figure 7. Qatar’s cumulated investments in new separation equipment (MMcf per year) 
[ PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE ] 
An inspection of these two figures conveys the following observations. From Figure 6, we observe 
that, under the BLM I mandate, the depressed equilibrium prices observed during the early years 
generate low marginal gains during these years and make it rational for Canada – a price taking agent – 
to delay the installation of helium separation capabilities.20  Qatar’s investment behavior is more subtle 
as it accounts for that agent’s ability to exert market power. Under the base-case demand trajectory, 
Qatar’s behavior is similar to that of Canada: during the years 2016-2020, the rapid extraction path used 
in BLM I results in a slower adoption of helium separation capabilities than the one observed with an 
extended BLM mandate of either 18 or 23 years. Under the slow-growth demand trajectory, the large 
volume extracted by the BLM in the years 2013-2018 makes it rational for Qatar to exert market power 
by: (i) supplying less than its production capacity, and (ii) delaying its investments into new separation 
capacities. After 2018, the BLM’s output becomes small under the rapid path BLM I but not with an 
extended mandate BLM II which explains why, during the years 2018-2025, Qatar’s capacity expansion 
is more rapid under BLM I than the one observed under BLM II. Altogether, these findings indicate that 
the BLM’s obligation to follow the “as-fast as-technically-possible” trajectory BLM I blurs the 
investment decisions in Canada and in Qatar during the years 2014-2022. 
c – Profits, surpluses, and welfare 
The net present values of the social welfare and the surpluses obtained by the market participants 
over the first 26 years are summarized in Table 3. These values have been obtained using a social real 
discount rate of 3 percent. 
                                                 
20 The first-order (i.e., the KKT) conditions for optimality of these agents’ decision problems indicate that, in each year, if a 
positive capacity expansion is decided, its level has to be such that the marginal cost of installing that capacity equals the 
present value of the marginal gains derived from helium processing (i.e., the difference between the marginal revenue and the 
marginal separation) in all the future years during which the capacity constraint (J3-3) is binding. 
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Table 3. The total discounted surplus obtained by consumers and producers (million $2014) 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
It is instructive to examine the net present values of the U.S. BLM’s future profits. These figures 
confirm that the performance of the rapid extraction path currently imposed on the U.S. BLM falls short 
of “the maximization of the financial return to the U.S. taxpayers,” a crucial policy objective yet 
explicitly stated in the 2013 Act. Under the current policy mandate (BLM I), the net present value of the 
future U.S. Treasury net revenues attains $835.3 million under the base-case demand trajectory and 
$780.2 million under the slow demand growth scenario. If the BLM was allowed to behave à la Cournot 
over a 13-year span (respectively a 23-year span), that net present value would be between +50.2 
percent and +61.0 percent larger (respectively between +25.5 percent and +56.4 percent larger).  
From a net social welfare perspective, note that under our each of the two base-case demand 
scenarios, opting for a less stringent mandate (BLM II) systematically augments the global welfare. The 
total discounted welfare gains are between 836.0 and 1,578.6 million 2014$, corresponding to an 0.59-
1.16 percent increase. This is also true, albeit with a lower magnitude, in case of a lower future demand 
with a delayed deployment in Russia. In that case, the welfare gains are on the order of 72.6-275.7 
million 2014$ which represents a modest increase of 0.06-0.22 percent. In the last scenario (i.e., “slow 
growth – rapid Russia”), the situation is less clear but the magnitude of the welfare changes remains 
small. So, opting for an extended mandate augments the global welfare in three out of the four scenarios 
and is nearly welfare neutral in the fourth scenario. 
The less stringent mandate Model II systematically yields an augmentation of the total surplus 
jointly obtained by the BLM and the U.S. producers. It is also important to highlight that, under the 
base-case demand, the consumer surplus obtained with the BLM Model II is systematically larger than 
that obtained with the rapid extraction path. The gains in total discounted consumer surplus are between 
531.2 and 1,355.5 million 2014$ and represent a 0.47-1.24 percent increase. A similar gain is also 
observed but with a smaller magnitude under the “slow growth – delayed Russia” scenario when the 
BLM operates during 18 or 23 years. So, the gain in producers’ surplus is not necessarily obtained at 
the expense of the consumers’ surplus. This is a rather counterintuitive result as one might expect that 
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allowing the BLM to behave as a profit-maximizing agent could cause a tradeoff between the 
consumers' and the producers' surpluses. 
It is also instructive to adopt a U.S. perspective when examining the figures presented in Table 3. 
By definition, only a share of the global consumer surplus accrues to U.S. consumers. If one assumes 
that the future U.S. share of the world helium consumption remains steady and equal to its 2014 level, 
i.e., approximately 30 percent (USGS, 2015), and that the willingness-to-pay of U.S. consumers is 
similar to those of foreign consumers, the following observations naturally emerge. First, with the base-
case demand projection, the U.S. consumers are systematically better-off when the BLM operates as a 
Cournot player and these gains more than outweigh the modest losses of surplus incurred by the U.S. 
private producers under BLM mandates of either 13 or 18 years. Second, under the slow demand 
growth scenario, allowing the BLM to operate during an extended mandate always augments the U.S. 
producers’ surplus but can be detrimental to national consumers (e.g., in the ambitious Russia scenario). 
That said, it is important to note that, whatever the scenario under scrutiny, the less stringent policy 
systematically improves the U.S. net social welfare defined as the sums of the surpluses obtained by the 
domestic consumers, the domestic producers and the U.S. government (through the BLM’s surplus). 
Overall, these results provide little or no support for the currently implemented policy BLM I as it can 
hardly represent a rational move for a self-centric government concerned solely with the domestic 
welfare. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Between 2010 and 2013, there was anxiety over the adequacy of helium resources for meeting our 
modern societies’ apparently insatiable appetite for goods and services that can hardly be produced 
without this substance. At that time, the U.S. Congress passed an Act aimed at organizing the rapid 
depletion of the Federal Helium Reserve operated by the U.S. BLM. The fundamental public policy 
issue examined in this paper is, thus, whether that rapid phase out of the Federal Reserve is or is not 
supported by both the current and future evolution of the world helium market.  
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To examine it, this paper presents a new partial equilibrium model of the global helium market 
that captures the essential features of that industry, including: the inertia of global helium consumption, 
which is impacted by both current and past decisions; the strategic behavior of some of the market 
participants; the role of both public and private storage inventories; and the endogenous modeling of 
capacity investments. The model has been calibrated and solved for four different scenarios. 
From the insights gained from market simulations, the answer to the public policy question above 
would appear to be no. Several lines of argument call for a modification of the rapid phase out imposed 
in the 2013 Act. First, the associated extraction path does not maximize the total financial return to the 
U.S. federal budget, which contradicts one of the policy objectives stated in the 2013 Act. Our 
simulation results indicate that the net present value of the future U.S. Treasury net revenues which is 
between 780.2 and 835.3 million 2014$ under the current policy could rise to 976.7-1,344.8 million 
2014$ under a less stringent mandate. Second, from a resource conservation perspective, that policy, 
and the low prices it generates during the early years, systematically induces a net waste of helium. We 
estimate that allowing the BLM to operate during an extended period of time would yield a reduction of 
U.S. helium venting that is on the order of 122.8–533.2 MMcf. Third, from a social perspective, we also 
found that a higher level of social welfare could be achieved in three out of the four scenarios examined 
in this paper. Lastly, a noteworthy finding must be highlighted: allowing the BLM to behave as a profit-
maximizing agent is not necessarily detrimental for the consumers as the consumer surplus augments in 
three out of the four scenarios examined in this paper when the BLM is allowed to operate during either 
18 or 23 years. 
Future possible research directions could include further analysis of the spatial nature of the 
helium industry. The analysis in this paper is based on a simplified representation of the world helium 
market that ignores spatial considerations and thus neglects the costly nature of intercontinental helium 
transportation. The construction of a more detailed and regionally disaggregated model of the world 
helium market would represent an appealing extension. However, to the best of our knowledge, this 
objective can hardly be attained at present because of a lack of regionally disaggregated time series on 
both prices and consumption levels. Should this limitation be slackened in the future, the development 
of a spatially-extended version of the WHM would usefully inform international helium trade issues. 
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Appendix A – Nomenclature 
This appendix summarizes the notation used in the paper. 
Sets  
Tt ∈  The set of all the time periods { }1,..., HT  considered in the WHM. 
j J∈  The set of all the suppliers. 
BLM  The BLM as a supplier ({ }BLM J⊂ ). 
1J  The subset of all the private suppliers processing helium from gas fields where future 
production cannot increase ( 1J J⊂ ) 
2J  The subset of all the private U.S. suppliers with plants connected to the BLM’s storage 
system ( 2J J⊂ ). 
3J  The subset of all the private suppliers that can invest to expand their future annual 
production of helium ( 3J J⊂ ). 
Control variables (defined for { }1,..., Ht T∈ ) 
j
tq  
The quantity of helium supplied by supplier j  in period t . 
tp  
The price of helium in period t . 
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j
th   The quantity of helium separated in period t  by supplier j  in 2J . 
j
ti   The quantity of helium injected in period t  into the storage by supplier j  in 2J . 
j
tw  The quantity of helium withdrawn in period t  from the storage site by supplier j  in 2J . 
j
tk  The incremental capacity decided in period t  by supplier j  in 3J . 
State variables (defined for { }0,..., Ht T∈ ) 
td  The total quantity of helium demanded in period t . The initial value 0d  is given. 
tR  The BLM’s reserve measured at the end of period t . The initial reserve 0R  is given. 
j
tv  The total volume stored by a supplier j  in 2J  at the end of period t . The initial volume 
0
jv  is given. 
j
tK   The total capacity 
j
tK  available to a supplier j  in 3J  at the end of period t . The initial 
capacity 0
jK  is given 
Parameters 
HT  The time horizon. 
BLMT  The period at the end of which the BLM must cease its commercial operations. 
α  The income coefficient in the demand equation. 
ty  The real income in year t . 
γ  The slope coefficient in the demand equation. 
λ  The lagged coefficient in the demand equation. 
R  The BLM’s reserve allocated to non-commercial uses.  
BLM
tQ  The BLM’s production ceiling in year t  as imposed in Figure 1. 
jβ  The discount factor used by agent j . 
BLMC  The unit extraction cost incurred by the BLM. 
η  The slope coefficient in the geological function describing the BLM’s production capacity 
as a function of the BLM’s remaining reserve. 
µ  The intercept coefficient in the geological function describing the BLM’s production 
capacity as a function of the BLM’s remaining reserve. 
jδ  The binary parameter indicating whether agent j  has a perfect competitive behavior (
0jδ = ) or a Cournot oligopolistic behavior ( 1jδ = ). 
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e
jC   The unit cost incurred by j  to purchase and refine crude helium from the natural gas 
producers. 
j
tH  The maximum quantity of helium that can be extracted by producer j  in year t . 
i
jC  The unit storage cost of injection operations (for agents in the set 2J ). 
w
jC  The unit storage cost of withdrawal operations (for agents in the set 2J ). 
S  The unit cost to hold one unit into the storage (for agents in the set 2J ). 
Appendix B – Calibration of the demand function 
This appendix details the estimation of the empirical demand equation. We first present our 
approach and the methodology. Then, we clarify the data sources before presenting the estimates. 
Methodology 
This study assumes that the future levels of world helium consumption are determined using an 
empirical model that is consistent with observed historical patterns. De facto, this approach solely 
accounts for already existing commercial uses. One may thus wonder whether the future demand for 
helium could rise well above the levels predicted by this empirical model if confinement fusion or 
superconducting transmission became commercially attractive as discussed in Nuttall et al. (2012b). 
Nevertheless, the demand projections associated with these prospective uses have a speculative nature 
as little is known about their probabilities of becoming commercial technologies and the associated 
willingness-to-pay for helium. As our discussion is primarily centered on the next two decades, we 
believe that this empirical approach is sufficient to generate credible demand projections over that 
horizon. 
We assume that td  the global helium consumption at year t can be explained using two 
explanatory variables. First, helium is a normal good. So, we expect to observe a negative relation 
between helium consumption and its real price tp . Second, helium consumption is mainly observed in 
countries that have attained a certain level of technological sophistication and is thus likely to be 
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positively driven by the level of economic development. Hence, we also include ty , the real GDP (in 
level), within our specification.  
As industrial evidence suggests that a substantial share of helium is used in long-lived equipment 
(e.g., in medical scanners, in electronic manufacturing), a dynamic specification might be preferable to 
take into consideration the dependence upon lagged values of the explanatory variables. Assuming a 
Koyck partial adjustment model, we thus consider the following linear specification:  
1. . .t t t t td y p dφ α γ λ ε−= + − + + ,       (B.1) 
where tε  is a random error term. According to this partial adjustment specification, helium 
consumption levels are explained as functions of the explanatory variables as well as the lagged value 
of the lagged dependent variable. This latter variable represents the inertia of economic behavior as it 
allows helium consumption to change gradually over time rather than immediately as each independent 
variable changes. The following can also be said about the coefficients φ , α , γ  and λ  to be estimated. 
Normally, we would expect the lagged-adjustment coefficient λ  to verify 0 1λ≤ < . In addition, we 
would expect that the short-run elasticity of consumption with respect to income is positive (which 
suggests that the slope coefficient α  verifies 0α > ), and that the short-run elasticity of consumption 
with respect to price is negative (which imposes that the associated slope coefficient γ  verifies 0γ > ).  
Data 
We use the successive editions of the USGS Minerals Yearbook to assemble annual time series for 
both helium consumption in million cubic feet (MMcf) and the real helium price (in constant 2014 
dollars per thousand cubic feet ($/Mcf) during the period 1995–2014. Regarding the later series, we use 
the private industry’s price figures for gaseous helium reported in the successive editions of the USGS 
Minerals Yearbook as these figures are reputed to represent the marginal value of helium in each year. 
The real GDP (in trillion 2014 dollars) series for the high and upper middle income countries (i.e., those 
where helium is consumed) have been downloaded from the World Bank database. Table B.1 provides 
the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for all of these variables in levels. 
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Table B.1. Summary statistics 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.1 HERE ] 
Results 
The estimation results are summarized in Table B.2 (Panel 1). The signs and magnitudes of the 
estimates are consistent with our expectations but the intercept coefficient is clearly not significant. 
Thus, we follow a general-to-specific procedure whereby the regressors with the lowest absolute t-
statistics are successively eliminated and the restricted models are then compared on the basis of the 
Akaike information criterion to identify the one with the lowest value. That procedure confirms that the 
intercept coefficient should be eliminated. The estimates obtained with the restricted specification are 
detailed in Table B.2 (Panel 2). The signs of these estimates are consistent with our expectations and the 
residuals exhibit no signs of serial correlation. We thus proceed using the restricted model.  
Table B.2. Estimation results 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.2 HERE ] 
The coefficient of the lagged demand is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that 
helium demand slowly adjusts to changes in the explanatory variables. In 2014, helium consumption 
amounted to 6,561.6 MMcf and the price was $200 per Mcf which suggests that the short-run and long-
run price elasticities were -0.16 and -0.82 respectively. These low values indicate that global helium 
consumption is little price-sensitive at that price level.  
The market simulations presented in this paper are based on an exogenous trajectory for the future 
real income that is posited to follow a constant rate of growth path. Hence, for each year t  in T  and 
each market, the income parameter used in the demand equation (1) is given by ( ) 12014. 1
t
ty Y g
−= + , 
where 2014Y  is the GDP at year 2014 (i.e., 71.809 trillion dollars), and g  is the posited autonomous rate 
of growth. To initialize the demand trajectory, we also need the global consumption observed in year 0, 
i.e., 0d = 6,309.3 MMcf (source: USGS). 
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Appendix C – Cost and geological parameters 
This appendix details the cost and geological parameters used in the market simulations for each 
market participant. 
a – The U.S. BLM  
The BLM’s initial helium reserve 0R  at the end of year 0 is 10,840.9 MMcf (source: U.S. BLM). 
The unit extraction cost BLMC  is equal to $33.7 per Mcf. The BLM’s geological parameters η  and µ  
that jointly determine the production ceiling function at the Cliffside reservoir (cf., equations BLM II – 
2 and BLM III – 2) have been estimated using the production and reserve series (in MMcf) publicly 
announced by the US BLM (cf., Figure 1). The ordinary least squares estimates are presented in Table 
C.1 (Panel 1). These estimates are statistically significant and this simple linear model provides an 
excellent fit. We thus proceed using this empirical model. 
Table C.1. Estimation results 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.1 HERE ] 
b – The existing helium separators  
Three types of parameters are required to simulate the behavior of the already existing helium 
separators (i.e., the firms in groups 1J  and 2J ). First, the unit cost data 
e
jC  used in our simulations are 
presented in Table C.2. By convention, these values include all the costs incurred to purchase crude 
helium from the natural gas producers and refine it to obtain commercial-grade helium. These unit cost 
figures have been derived from cost engineering studies that consider a variety of factors including 
helium concentration in the source gas, the plant’s separation technology, its date of construction, and 
its location. 
Table C.2. Cost data for the firms in groups 1J  and 2J  (in $/Mcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.2 HERE ] 
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Second, exogenous production trajectories jtH  are needed for each of these players. These 
trajectories are detailed in Table C.3.  
Table C.3. Extraction trajectories jtH  for the firms in groups 1J  and 2J  (in MMcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.3 HERE ] 
Lastly, we have to consider the storage-related parameters needed for the firms in group 2J  that 
can store helium. Recall that the unit cost e
jC = $60.4 per Mcf detailed in Table C.2 assumes that the 
crude helium is refined to obtain commercial-grade helium. As the concentration of the helium stored in 
the underground reservoir is lower than that commercial specification, injecting commercial-grade 
helium in the storage site would generate a waste. Therefore, the producers in group 2J  typically inject 
half-refined helium (i.e., helium that is enriched to attain the specification needed for storage activities 
but not the commercial grade) in the storage site. Therefore, consistent with the convention used in this 
paper, the unit injection cost i
jC  considered here is the sum of two components: a negative one which 
gives the cost savings generated by less stringent refining needs, and a positive one which is directly 
related to the injection operations. As the magnitude of the former component is larger than that of the 
latter, the resulting unit cost i
jC  is negative and equal to -$9.54 per Mcf. We assume that 
w
jC  the unit 
cost to extract and purify the helium withdrawn from the storage site is $13.7 per Mcf and that S  the 
unit storage cost is $5.91 per Mcf. At the end of 2013, the helium volume collectively stored by the 
private firms at the Hugoton-Panhandle complex amounted to 1,440.0 MMcf (source: USGS). Because 
of a lack of publicly available information on the amount individually stored by each firm, an 
assumption is needed to apportion that total volume. Here, we posit that each player j  in 2J  is 
endowed with an initial volume 0
jv  reflecting the size of its processing plants that is 537.4 MMcf 
(respectively 64.7, 449.4, and 388.5 MMcf) for the player Hugoton-Panhandle 1 (respectively Hugoton-
Panhandle 2, 3, 4).  
d – The new players 
The cost data for the players in group 3J  are detailed in Table C.4.  
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Table C.4. Cost data for the firms in group 3J  (in $/Mcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.4 HERE ] 
Table C.5. details the time path of the exogenous production trajectories jtH  posited for each 
player in 3J .  
Table C.5. Extraction trajectories jtH  for the firms in group 3J  (in MMcf) 
[ PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.5 HERE ] 
These trajectories are based on the following assumptions. For Canada, Wyoming 2, South Africa 
and Utah 2, the trajectories are derived from IHS (2014) and Gasworld (2015, 2016). The extraction 
path for Colorado 2 is the one detailed in Brock (2014). In Algeria, Iran and Qatar, the helium 
concentration in the crude natural gas is low and the future availability of helium-rich gas is directly 
connected to the future development of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry in these countries 
(Reinoehl, 2012; IHS, 2014; Anderson, 2017).21 So, for Algeria, we assume that the country’s unique 
expansion possibility is in the equipment of the LNG train in Skikda. Consistent with the projections 
presented in EIA (2016) and Cedigaz (2016), we assume that there will be no future expansion of the 
country’s LNG processing capacity. For Qatar, we assume that the capacity additions that can be 
decided during the first decade are bounded by the availability of helium-rich tail gases emanating from 
existing LNG train (IHS, 2014). Beyond that horizon, the posited trajectory accounts for the country’s 
ambition to expand by 30 percent its LNG processing capabilities in the mid-2020s (Rogers, 2017). 
Regarding Iran, we follow Cedigaz (2016) and the discussion in IHS (2014) and assume that the 
commencement of helium separation activities will not occur before the end of the 2020s.  
                                                 
21 The LNG manufacturing process involves a number of gas purification stages. In the tail gases emanating from these 
operations, the helium concentration is: (i) greater than that originally found in the LNG plant’s natural gas feedstock, and  
(ii) large enough to support helium separation. Hence, the future availability of crude helium in these countries directly 
mirrors the future deployment of LNG processing capabilities. 
 
Table 1. Players 
Type of player Player Posited Strategic Behavior 
BLM U.S. BLM See Section 3.2 
1J  
Australia Cournot 
China Price-taking 
Poland Price-taking 
Colorado 1 Price-taking 
Kansas Price-taking 
New Mexico Price-taking 
Wyoming 1 Cournot 
Utah 1 Price-taking 
2J  
Hugoton-Panhandle 1  Cournot 
Hugoton-Panhandle 2  Price-taking 
Hugoton-Panhandle 3  Cournot 
Hugoton-Panhandle 4 Cournot 
3J  
Algeria Cournot 
Canada Price-taking 
Iran Cournot 
Qatar Cournot 
Russia Cournot 
South Africa Price-taking 
Colorado 2 Cournot 
Wyoming 2 Cournot 
Utah 2 Price-taking 
  
 
Table 2. Annual helium venting by the firms in group 1J  (in MMcf)  
  Base-case demand Slow growth scenario 
  Ambitious 
Russian 
Delayed 
Russian 
Ambitious 
Russian 
Delayed 
Russian 
Imposed trajectory (BLM Model I)     
 Utah 1     
 Year 1 160.0 160.0 160.0 160.0 
 Year 2 160.0 160.0 160.0 160.0 
 Year 3 160.0 160.0 160.0 160.0 
 Year 4 160.0 160.0 160.0 160.0 
 Wyoming 1     
 Year 1 0.0 0.0 20.8 20.8 
 Total helium wasted 640.0 640.0 660.8 660.8 
Cournot player (BLM Model II – 13 years)     
 Utah 1     
 Year 1 160.0 160.0  160.0  160.0 
 Year 2 160.0 160.0  160.0  160.0 
 Year 3 0.0 0.0  146.7  95.8 
 Year 4 0.0 0.0  71.3  37.5 
 Total helium wasted 320.0 320.0 538.0 453.3 
Cournot player (BLM Model II – 18 years)     
 Utah 1     
 Year 1 160.0 160.0 160.0 160.0 
 Year 2 43.3 3.4 160.0 160.0 
 Total helium wasted 203.3 163.4 320.0 320.0 
Cournot player (BLM Model II – 23 years)     
 Utah 1     
 Year 1 160.0 106.8 160.0 160.0 
 Year 2 0.0 0.0 160.0 160.0 
 Total helium wasted 160.0 106.8 320.0 320.0 
Note: A zero slack is observed in the other years and/or the other agents and has not been reported for the sake of brevity.  
  
 
Table 3. The total discounted surplus obtained by consumers and producers (million $2014) 
   Imposed 
trajectory  
(BLM I) 
BLM II 
13 years 
BLM II 
18 years 
BLM II 
23 years 
   Value Difference 
with BLM I 
Value Difference 
with BLM I 
Value Difference 
with BLM I 
B
a
se
ca
se
 d
e
m
a
n
d
 
A
m
b
it
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u
s 
R
u
ss
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n
 
Consumer 
Surplus 
 112,403.4   112,934.7   531.2  113,530.2  1,126.8   113,758.9   1,355.5  
BLM’s Surplus  835.3   1,317.7   482.4  1,184.9   349.6   1,236.9   401.6  
US Producers’ 
Surplus 
 9,250.8   9,223.2   -27.6 9,230.4   -20.4  9,284.2   33.4  
Foreign 
Producers’ 
Surplus 
 18,577.5   18,427.4   -150.0 18,378.3   -199.1  18,315.4   -262.0 
Social Welfare  141,067.0   141,903.0   836.0  142,323.9  1,256.9   142,595.4   1,528.5  
D
e
la
y
e
d
 R
u
ss
ia
n
 
Consumer 
Surplus 
 106,161.6   106,739.0   577.3   107,385.3   1,223.7   107,479.1   1,317.5  
BLM’s Surplus  835.3   1,344.8   509.5   1,239.0   403.7   1,306.7   471.4  
US Producers’ 
Surplus 
 9,738.8   9,712.5   -26.3  9,716.2   -22.5  9,777.3   38.5  
Foreign 
Producers’ 
Surplus 
 18,935.0   18,778.5   -156.4  18,726.3   -208.6  18,686.1   -248.8 
Social Welfare  135,670.7   136,574.8   904.1   137,066.8   1,396.2   137,249.2   1,578.6  
S
lo
w
 d
e
m
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d
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R
u
ss
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Consumer 
Surplus 
 106,766.7   106,245.4   -521.3  106,660.7   -106.0  106,528.9   -237.8 
BLM’s Surplus  780.2   1,171.5   391.3   976.7   196.4   979.2   199.0  
US Producers’ 
Surplus 
 6,796.2   6,866.5   70.3   6,860.3   64.1   6,877.9   81.7  
Foreign 
Producers’ 
Surplus 
 11,596.8   11,506.7  -90.0  11,447.1   -149.6  11,447.1   -149.7 
Social Welfare  125,939.9   125,790.1   -149.8  125,944.9   4.9   125,833.1   -106.8 
D
e
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y
e
d
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u
ss
ia
n
 
Consumer 
Surplus 
 102,990.0   102,712.7   -277.3  103,161.7   171.7   103,020.3   30.3  
BLM’s Surplus  780.2   1,191.9   411.6   997.7   217.4   1,001.2   221.0  
US Producers’ 
Surplus 
 7,121.6   7,174.4   52.8   7,166.0   44.5   7,186.2   64.7  
Foreign 
Producers’ 
Surplus 
 12,146.7   12,032.2   -114.5  11,988.7   -157.9  11,984.8   -161.9 
Social Welfare  123,038.4   123,111.1   72.6   123,314.1   275.7   123,192.5   154.1  
Note: These figures are the net present values measured over the first 26 years using a social discount rate of 3 percent. The 
figures in bold in the columns BLM Model II indicate a value higher than the one obtained with the BLM Model I.  
 
 
 
 
Table B.1. Summary statistics 
 
td  tGDP  tp  
 [MMcf] [10
12
 2014 USD] [2014 USD/Mcf] 
Mean  5,512.31  55.11  109.33 
Median  5,627.86  53.18  82.63 
Maximum  6,561.63  71.81  203.22 
Minimum  3,753.11  42.35  59.68 
Standard deviation  800.34  11.31  49.79 
Skewness -0.859  0.299  0.699 
Kurtosis  2.953  1.474  1.966 
  
  
 
Table B.2. Estimation results 
 Constant 
tGDP  tp  1td −  2
R  S.E. LM(2) 
 φ   α   γ   λ   
Panel 1:  td  176.322 29.044 4.537 0.787
*
 
0.903 249.526 2.631 
 (596.589) (21.067) (4.212) (0.116) 
Panel 2:  td  _ 33.435
*
 5.514
*
 0.795
*
 
0.908 242.736 2.152 
  (14.531) (2.536) (0.110) 
Note: OLS estimates. The variables are in levels and not in logarithms. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are shown in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.05 level. 
2
R is the adjusted R-squared, S.E. is the standard error of 
regression and LM(2) is the Breusch-Godfrey LM-test for 2nd order autocorrelation. 
 
 
Table C.1. Estimation results 
 1tR −  Constant 2
R  S.E. LM(2) 
 η  µ  
BLM
tq  0.1385
*
 22.634
*
 
0.999 13.576 4.208 
 (0.0011) (6.025) 
Note: OLS estimates. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at the 
0.05 level. 
2
R is the adjusted R-squared, S.E. is the standard error of regression and LM(2) is the Breusch-Godfrey LM-test 
for 2nd order autocorrelation. 
 
Table C.2. Cost data for the firms in groups 1J  and 2J  (in $/Mcf) 
 Players in group 1J      Players in group 2J  
 
AU CN PL CO-1 KS NM WY-1 
UT1 
 
(a)
 
HP-1 HP-2 HP-3 HP-4 
Unit 
costs 
e
jC  
90.0 80.3 79.0 87.0 67.9 100.4 42.8 155.0  60.4 60.4 60.4 60.4 
Note: AU: Australia; CN: China; PL: Poland; CO-1: Colorado 1; KS: Kansas; NM: New Mexico; WY-1: Wyoming 1; UT-1: 
Utah 1; HP-1 to HP-4: Hugoton-Panhandle 1 to 4. These cost data are based on detailed cost-engineering studies available at 
IFP Energies Nouvelles—a French public R&D center focused on geoscience and chemical engineering—and have been 
double-checked by industry contacts. These values reflect a variety of factors including helium concentration in the source 
gas, the chemical composition of the feed gas, the separation technology, the plant’s design, and its location. (a) The large cost 
of that plant is explained by the costly nature of the feed gas used for that plant because it has to be transported to the plant 
via tube trailers. 
 
Table C.3. Extraction trajectories jtH  for the firms in groups 1J  and 2J  (in MMcf) 
 Players in group 1J      Players in group 2J  
 
AU 
(a)
 
CN 
(b)
 
PL 
(c)
 
CO-1 
(c)
 
KS 
(d)
 
NM 
(c)
 
WY-1 
(d)
 
UT1 
 
(d)
 
HP-1 
(c)
 
HP-2 
(c)
 
HP-3 
(c)
 
HP-4 
(c)
 
Year 1 150.0 10.6 137.0 55.2 36.5 1.3 1,450.0 160.0 469.5 56.6 392.7 339.8 
Year 2 150.0 10.6 137.0 43.5 36.5 1.0 1,450.0 160.0 445.7 53.8 372.8 322.7 
Year 3 150.0 10.6 137.0 34.3 36.5 0.8 1,450.0 160.0 404.5 48.8 338.3 292.8 
Year 4 150.0 10.6 137.0 27.1 36.5 0.6 1,450.0 160.0 357.1 43.1 298.7 258.5 
Year 5 150.0 10.6 137.0 21.3 36.5 0.5 1,450.0 160.0 323.4 39 270.5 234.1 
Year 6 150.0 10.6 123.3 16.5 36.5 0.4 1,450.0 160.0 287.8 34.7 240.7 208.3 
Year 7 150.0 10.6 111.0 10.8 36.5 0.3 1,450.0 160.0 256 30.9 214.2 185.3 
Year 8 150.0 10.6 99.9 8.4 36.5 0.2 1,450.0 160.0 226.2 27.3 189.2 163.7 
Year 9 150.0 10.6 89.9 6.0 36.5 0.2 1,450.0 160.0 194.9 23.5 163 141 
Year 10 120.0 10.6 80.9 4.8 36.5 0.1 1,450.0 160.0 174 21 145.5 125.9 
Year 11 96.0 10.6 72.8 3.7 36.5 0.1 1,450.0 160.0 157.3 19 131.6 113.9 
Year 12 76.8 10.6 65.5 2.5 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 137.6 16.6 115.1 99.6 
Year 13 61.4 10.6 59.0 2.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 120.6 14.5 100.9 87.3 
Year 14 49.2 10.6 53.1 1.5 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 110.4 13.3 92.4 79.9 
Year 15 39.3 10.6 47.8 0.8 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 94.5 11.4 79.1 68.4 
Year 16 31.5 10.6 43.0 0.7 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 85.8 10.3 71.7 62.1 
Year 17 25.2 10.6 38.7 0.5 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 72.3 8.7 60.5 52.4 
Year 18 20.1 10.6 34.8 0.4 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 63.4 7.7 53 45.9 
Year 19 16.1 10.6 31.3 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 51.9 6.3 43.4 37.6 
Year 20 12.9 10.6 28.2 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 46.4 5.6 38.8 33.6 
Year 21 10.3 10.6 25.4 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 38.5 4.6 32.2 27.9 
Year 22 8.2 10.6 22.8 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 31.3 3.8 26.2 22.7 
Year 23 6.6 10.6 20.6 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 24.2 2.9 20.2 17.5 
Year 24 5.3 10.6 18.5 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 18.8 2.3 15.8 13.6 
Year 25 0.0 10.6 16.7 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 14.2 1.7 11.9 10.3 
Year 26 0.0 10.6 15.0 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 10.9 1.3 9.1 7.9 
Year 27 0.0 10.6 13.5 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 8.4 1 7.1 6.1 
Year 28 0.0 10.6 12.1 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 6.5 0.8 5.4 4.7 
Year 29 0.0 10.6 10.9 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 5 0.6 4.1 3.6 
Year 30 0.0 10.6 9.8 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 3.8 0.5 3.2 2.7 
Year 31 0.0 10.6 8.9 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 2.8 0.3 2.3 2 
Year 32 0.0 10.6 8.0 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 2.1 0.3 1.8 1.5 
Year 33 0.0 10.6 7.2 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 1.6 0.2 1.3 1.1 
Year 34 0.0 10.6 6.5 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 1.1 0.1 0.9 0.8 
Year 35 0.0 10.6 5.8 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.6 
Year 36 0.0 10.6 5.2 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.5 
Year 37 0.0 10.6 0.0 0.0 36.5 0.0 1,450.0 160.0 0.4 0 0.3 0.3 
Notes: AU: Australia; CN: China; PL: Poland; CO-1: Colorado 1; KS: Kansas; NM: New Mexico; WY-1: Wyoming 1; UT-
1: Utah 1; HP-1 to HP-4: Hugoton-Panhandle 1 to 4. (a) As the feed gas for the Australian plant comes from an LNG plant, 
this extraction path has been obtained from commercial information related to the scheduled sales of LNG at that plant. (b) 
This trajectory has been derived from IHS (2014). (c) These trajectories are derived from Mohr and Ward (2014, high growth 
scenario). (d) This extraction path has been derived from the analyses published in Gasworld, a professional journal. 
 
Table C.4. Cost data for the firms in group 3J  (in $/Mcf) 
  Algeria Canada Iran Qatar Russia South Africa Colorado 2 Wyoming 2 Utah 2 
Unit operation cost 
e
jC   55.0 157.9 72.0 72.0 69.0 40.0 77.0 42.8 75.0 
Unit investment cost 
k
jC  107.3 218.9 270.7 274.7 383.3 230.0 240.2 220.2 250.5 
Notes: These data are based on detailed cost-engineering studies available at IFP Energies Nouvelles—a French public R&D 
center focused on geoscience and chemical engineering—and have been double-checked by industry contacts. These unit cost 
data reflect a variety of factors including helium concentration in the source gas, the chemical composition of the feed gas, 
the plant’s possible design, and its location.  
 
  
 
Table C.5. Extraction trajectories jtH  for the firms in group 3J  (in MMcf) 
 
Algeria Canada Iran Qatar 
Russia 
(a)
 South 
Africa 
Colorado 
2 
Wyoming 
2 
Utah 
2  AR Path DR Path 
Initial capacity 
0
jK  870.0 0.0 0.0 1990.0 230.0 230.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Year 1 870.0 0.0 0.0 1,990.0 230.0 230.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Year 2 870.0 0.0 0.0 1,990.0 230.0 230.0 0.0 230.0 100.0  36.5   
Year 3 870.0 0.0 0.0 1,990.0 230.0 230.0 0.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 4 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 1,990.0 230.0 230.0 0.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 5 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,203.0 230.0 230.0 50.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 6 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 230.0 230.0 100.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 7 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 230.0 230.0 100.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 8 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 468.0 468.0 100.0 230.0 200.0  36.5   
Year 9 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 706.0 706.0 100.0 230.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 10 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 706.0 706.0 100.0 230.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 11 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 706.0 706.0 82.0 230.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 12 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 944.0 706.0 69.0 201.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 13 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,415.0 1,182.0 706.0 58.0 175.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 14 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,564.0 1,182.0 944.0 49.0 153.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 15 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 2,834.0 1,182.0 1,182.0 41.0 133.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 16 1,200.0 40.0 0.0 3,103.0 1,420.0 1,182.0 34.0 116.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 17 1,200.0 40.0 250.0 3,103.0 1,658.0 1,182.0 28.0 101.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 18 1,200.0 40.0 500.0 3,103.0 1,658.0 1,182.0 23.0 88.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 19 1,200.0 40.0 500.0 3,103.0 1,658.0 1,182.0 19.0 77.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 20 1,200.0 40.0 500.0 3,103.0 1,896.0 1,420.0 16.0 67.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 21 1,200.0 40.0 500.0 3,103.0 2,134.0 1,658.0 13.0 58.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 22 1,200.0 40.0 750.0 3,103.0 2,134.0 1,658.0 11.0 50.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 23 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,134.0 1,658.0 0.0 43.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 24 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,372.0 1,658.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 25 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 1,658.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 26 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 1,896.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 27 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,134.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 28 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,134.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 29 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,134.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 30 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,134.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 31 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,134.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 32 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,372.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 33 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,610.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 34 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,610.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 35 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,610.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 36 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,610.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Year 37 1,200.0 40.0 1,000.0 3,103.0 2,610.0 2,610.0 0.0 0.0 400.0  36.5   
Note: The initial capacities are based on IHS (2014). (a) This table details two trajectories for the future Russian deployment: 
either the rapid one assumed in the “Ambitious Russian” path or the slower one (i.e., the “Delayed Russian” case). 
 
Figure 1. The time-path of the FHR’s planned production trajectory 
 
Source: www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/nm/programs/0/helium_docs.Par.6729.File.dat/Helium%20Delivery%20Model.pdf 
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Figure 2. The BLM’s remaining reserve at the end of the year (in MMcf) 
 Ambitious Russian Delayed Russian 
B
a
se
ca
se
 D
e
m
a
n
d
 
  
S
lo
w
 G
ro
w
th
 
  
  
 
Figure 3. Annual helium consumption (in MMcf)  
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Figure 4. Equilibrium prices (in $/Mcf)  
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Figure 5. Volume of storage owned by private producers at the end of the year (MMcf) 
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Figure 6. Canada’s cumulated investments in new separation equipment (MMcf per year) 
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Figure 7. Qatar’s cumulated investments in new separation equipment (MMcf per year) 
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